The Return of Fires: Why Artillery is Again the God of War

Steel rains are back in fashion. From Ukraine’s drone-cued HIMARS to China’s saturation fires doctrine, this deep dive explores why artillery is once again the deciding force in modern war—and how U.S. doctrine is racing to catch up.

Photo by 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit

“You don’t own the ground until your artillery says you can.”
– Every salty fires NCO ever

Welcome to the Age of Explosive Relevance

For the past two decades, fire support in U.S. doctrine took a doctrinal backseat. During the height of COIN (counterinsurgency) ops in Iraq and Afghanistan, artillery units were repurposed for everything from convoy security to detainee operations. Fire missions? Rare. Steel on target? Almost ceremonial.

But LSCO—Large Scale Combat Operations—is back on the table. And guess who walked back into the command tent with swagger? That’s right: Fires.

The wars in Ukraine and the PLA’s evolving doctrine show us why. This isn’t your granddad’s redleg playbook—it’s drone-cued, networked, multi-domain, and nasty.


The COIN Hangover: A Generation of Underinvestment

During the Global War on Terror (GWOT), fires units became rare beasts. Artillerymen were repurposed as infantry, MPs, or convoy security. Ammo stockpiles dwindled. Gunnery tables got dusty. Why? Because in Iraq and Afghanistan, fires were constrained by ROEs, close proximity to civilians, and the irregular nature of the fight. When CAS was on call 24/7 and ISR gave you persistent eyes, who needed massed artillery?

But this bred a fires force optimized for permissive airspace, static positions, and low-tempo engagements—not for high-intensity peer fights in contested domains. And adversaries noticed.

Coin to Counterbattery: The Doctrinal Rebound

The pivot from COIN to LSCO has flipped the script. ADP 3-0 and FM 3-0 (2022) marked the formal doctrinal shift—refocusing the force on decisive action in peer and near-peer fights. And FM 3-09 and ATP 3-09 (Field Artillery and Fire Support) updated the playbook with tighter fire coordination, deep strike integration, and digitally compressed kill chains.

Back then, fires supported maneuver. Today? Fires shape the battlespace, enabling maneuver by disabling the enemy’s ability to think, move, and shoot.


Ukraine: Fires Reborn on the Steppes

Ukraine flipped the script. Russian doctrine, per ATP 7-100.1, has always emphasized overwhelming artillery barrages to prep the battlespace. But Ukraine, with fewer tubes and smarter brains, pulled off a doctrinal revolution. Enter distributed precision fires.

  • HIMARS became a meme and a menace. Not because it was new, but because Ukraine weaponized its C2 architecture. It fused ISR (including commercial drones and satellite) with deep strike packages in a compressed kill chain model.
  • Decentralized targeting enabled frontline units to call for fires within minutes, skipping the layers of bureaucracy typical in NATO militaries.
  • Mobility and shoot-and-scoot tactics countered Russian counterbattery radars—an echo of FM 3-09’s emphasis on survivability in high-lethality environmentsMilitary Doctrine.
  • Logistics as a limiting factor: Russia’s inability to keep its firebases supplied highlighted what ADP 3-0 (2022) now hammers home—fires are only as lethal as their supply chains are resilient.

The Ukrainian military’s use of Nett Warrior-style tablets for fire direction has become the stuff of modern legend. It’s doctrine on the fly—and it’s wrecking Russian maneuver and mass.


The Loitering Revolution

Let’s talk loitering munitions. These are not just fancy kamikaze drones. They’re the midpoint between a fire mission and a forward observer. They blur the line between sensor and shooter.

Systems like the Switchblade, Phoenix Ghost, Lancet, and Geran/Shahed-136 aren’t just tactical gadgets. They’re changing fires doctrine:

  • Persistent ISR over a target area without committing manned aircraft.
  • On-demand strike capability without a call for fire.
  • Integrated into digital fires networks, where a loitering munition is the fire mission.

What Makes Loitering Munitions So Disruptive?

  • Sensor-shooter fusion in one package. The munition finds the target, identifies it, and destroys it.
  • Time-on-target compression: No delay waiting for fire direction or BDA reports. The weapon does both.
  • Agile targeting: Can be redirected mid-flight based on live info. Imagine artillery that changes its mind.
  • Deep area access: Can penetrate A2/AD bubbles, especially when launched in saturation swarms or from hidden positions.

Ukraine’s use of KUB and Warmate drones for deep-strike interdiction has made Russian rear echelons no-go zones. And vice versa, Russia’s Lancet drones have racked up kills on Western-supplied systems like the Caesar and M777. The U.S. Army is adapting via programs like Launched Effects and Air-Launched Loitering Munitions (ALM) for deep maneuver forces.

Doctrinal Adaptations

U.S. doctrine is just catching up. As of now, FM 3-09 and ATP 3-09 treat loitering munitions as “fires enablers” or “precision effects” tools. But Ukraine showed they should be integrated directly into company-level fire plans—alongside mortars and 155s.

Expect future ATP updates to codify:

  • Loitering munition fire missions (distinct from traditional CAS or artillery calls)
  • Decentralized launch authorities
  • Tactical munition swarms for shaping ops

This isn’t just an ISR-to-fires revolution. It’s ISR-as-firepower.


China’s Fires Doctrine: Mass + Precision = Lethal

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) isn’t watching from the sidelines. ATP 7-100.3: Chinese Tactics (2021) and recent open-source assessments paint a picture of a fires doctrine that’s evolving from massed industrial artillery to precision, multi-domain strike systems.

Key Features of PLA Fires Doctrine Evolution

  1. System Destruction Warfare (系统破击战):
    PLA doesn’t just want to destroy forces—they aim to collapse enemy operational systems. Fires target:
    • C2 nodesComms relaysLong-range sensorsKey logistics hubs
    It’s fires as information denial and dislocation.
  2. Integrated Joint Fires:
    PLA fires are now cross-domain by design. Ground, naval, air, cyber, space. Think joint rocket forces striking comms satellites while EW units blind radars and long-range tube arty decimates your ammo dump.
  3. Loitering Munitions and UAV Artillery Hybrids:
    China fields a growing array of loitering munitions: CH-901: Backpack-portable loitering munition with EO/IR sensors WS-43: A truck-launched, tube-fired loitering UAV with a 60 km rangeASN series: Tactical recon and strike drones with modular payloads
    These are cheap, saturating, and rapidly deployable—perfect for swarming high-value targets, or hunting artillery in depth.
  4. Rocket Artillery and SRBM Integration:
    The PLA Rocket Force, paired with long-range MLRS (like the PHL-03 and PCL-191), can deliver fires up to 500 km. They’re combining SRBMs, loitering drones, and EW support into joint strike packages—no longer separate fires lanes, but fused kill chains.

What This Means for the U.S. and Allies

Tactical:

  • Every vehicle is a target—fires signature management becomes existential. Camouflage, deception (JP 3-13.4), and movement discipline are back on the menu.
  • Short-range ADA and counter-drone teams need to be integrated into every maneuver element.
  • S2 shops must fuse drone intel into real-time threat matrices. Your FO team might now be a drone pilot with a tablet.

Operational/Strategic:

  • Kill web integration: Fires platforms—from HIMARS to drone teams—must be cross-service and cross-domain interoperable. That’s the Mosaic Warfare vision.
  • Stockpiles must evolve: Precision is great. Volume is survival. Expect a surge in demand for cheap, attritable loitering systems to match China and Russia.

NTC/JRTC Implications:

  • Expect OPFOR to launch loitering munition “hunts” on FDCs and sustainment units.
  • Training rotations may feature live drone feed emulation to simulate real-time strike threats.
  • Fires doctrine will be tested under persistent surveillance and precision harassment conditions.
  • OPFOR now routinely uses drone-spotted fires and loitering munitions to simulate anti-access and counter-mobility.
  • Blue Force units must digitally integrate fire support early, or they’ll die on the march.
  • Counterbattery survivability is back on the map—shoot-and-scoot tactics, decoys, and mobile CPs are no longer optional.

Expect to see:

  • New focus on kill web resilience—can your fires network survive if comms drop?
  • LOE (Lines of Effort) in scenarios that prioritize long-range fires shaping before the first contact.
  • OPFOR using “PLA-inspired” doctrine—targeting logistics, communications, and fire direction centers as Day 0 targets.

Final Salvo: Fires Are Not “Support” Anymore

Artillery isn’t the God of War just because it makes stuff go boom. It’s because it changes everything around it—enemy behavior, friendly maneuver, tempo, survivability. In a fight against China or Russia, fires won’t just support the fight. They will be the fight.

Better get those tubes hot.